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Abstract
We simulate a DSGE model with state owned banks to analyze the impact of
bank recapitalization as a policy action in response to loan defaults by rms. As a
special case, we calibrate the model to India, an emerging economy with state-owned
banks facing a minimum investment requirement in safe assets and a sectoral lending
requirement. We analyze two di¤erent scenarios of government infused recapitalization
 an unconditional transfer to banks and an equity in exchange for transfer. Our
analysis shows that a government infused recapitalization in response to a negative TFP
shock may increase output in the short run. However, there is a welfare loss in both
cases, although higher for the unconditional transfers as compared with the equity
in exchange for transfer. Our analysis suggests that while bank recapitalization is a
welcome move to kick-start credit creation, capital formation and growth, especially
during a cyclical downturn, there is need for appropriate policy vigil to protect the
quality of public expenditure in the social sector that matters for welfare in the long
run.
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1 Introduction
The global nancial crisis (2008) underlined the pivotal role of the banking sector in advanced
and emerging market economies and also brought to fore some of the limitations of the
existing international banking regulations (see BIS Paper No. 60, 2018). Considering the
importance of banks as a shock absorber between the nancial and real sector, a host of
policy measures were initiated focusing upon improving the quality of banks balance sheets,
thereby providing cushion to these institutions against unexpected shocks. One of the major
banking sector reform measures included in the Basel III regulation relates to improving the
quality and quantity of banks capital, aimed to make the nancial system more resilient,
reduce the cost of borrowing, and promote economic growth (see BCBS regulation papers
on Basel IIIl, 2010) .Therefore, because of the increased capital requirements under Basel
III regulations, and to account for the erosion of capital during GFC defaults, banks have
required fresh bouts of recapitalization.
Historically, several large recapitalization measures were undertaken both in advanced
and emerging economies during the post-GFC period. For advanced economies such re-
capitalization measures were primarily undertaken through issuing debt, preference shares,
and/or common equity by the promoters of banks that are seeking recapitalization (Panetta
et al. 2009). However, recapitalizing banks in emerging market economies (EMEs) using the
same set of instruments is more challenging mainly because capital markets are underdevel-
oped, and availability of funds are costly. In addition, in EMEs like India, Government is the
major stake holder in many banks that contributes signicantly to the overall credit. Given
that real economic activity in EMEs and therefore GDP growth have largely been dependent
on credit creation by banks due to underdeveloped capital markets, and that large banks
are state-owned, recapitalization measures for these banks are typically undertaken by the
government.
An increase in regulatory requirement in the face of lack of promoters capital infusion
in EMEs could lead to signicant decline in risky investment and an increase in the share of
non-risky investments (such as government bonds) in order to achieve the target risk-based
capital adequacy requirements. To avoid such a regulatory arbitrage, governments have been
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facing increasing demand for budgetary allocation to banks capital for promoting e¢cient
allocation of resources and economic growth.
There is, however, a trade-o¤, with a government bank recapitalization plan. This could
result in rationalization of the governments capital investment and other social expendi-
tures. This might in turn have an adverse impact on the long-run economic growth and
welfare. Hence, the objective of this paper is to analyze the mechanics and o¤setting e¤ects
of a government induced recapitalization plan in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) framework. In our model we assume a state-owned bank dependent economy. We
model two di¤erent scenarios. In the rst, the government makes an unconditional transfer
to the state-owned banks to cover their losses due to rm defaults as a result of a negative
productivity shock. In the second scenario, the government extends conditional transfers,
i.e., the governments equity holding in these banks are linked to the transfers. Therefore,
higher transfers would imply a higher share of the government ownership of these banks.
We parametrize our model to the Indian economy, primarily because economic activity
in India is still largely dependent on bank credit. For instance, as on 2018, credit from banks
contributed to 34.66% of overall credit to the manufacturing sector. In addition, more than
63% of overall bank credit is extended by Public Sector Banks (PSBs). Moreover, Statutory
Liquidity Requirements (SLRs) requires banks to hold a mandatory portion of their deposits
in the form of government securities.1 Furthermore, a large portion of the population in India
is still dependent on the agriculture for a livelihood. Even though the share of agriculture
in overall GDP has been falling, banks are mandated to extend 40% of their adjusted net
credit to priority sectors.2 Therefore, even a negative rainfall shock may aggravate the stress
in the banking sector because of banks exposure to agriculture and the risks of negative
rainfall shocks. This will have an indirect impact on aggregate demand and output.
India is also committed to abide by the Basel III recommendations in a phased manner.
1See Table 46, Sectoral Deployment of Non-Food Credit, RBI Handbook of Statistics on the Indian
Economy, 2018 for data on manufacturing and priority sector oustanding credit calculations.
2As per the mandate, 40% of total Adjusted Net Bank Credit (ANBC) or Credit Equivalent Amount of
O¤-Balance Sheet Exposure (whichever is higher), must be extended towards Total Priority Sector Lending.
Of this, 18% of ANBC must be directed towards agriculture. See the RBI Master Direction on Priority
Sector Lending (2018): https://m.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_ViewMasDirections.aspx?id=10497
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PSBs in the past have received capitalization from the government. Such recapitalization
include recapitalization bonds (1994), special budgetary allocation and market borrowing
scheme (Indradhanush plan, 2015). In October 2017, the government announced recapital-
ization measures to improve the balance sheets of stressed banks, again through a combina-
tion of recapitalization bonds, budgetary support and market borrowing. Subsequent Union
Budgets also proposed funds for recapitalization.3 In terms of the scal cost, these large
infusions have reinvigorated the debate on whether such measures would crowd-out other
productive spending and thereby adversely impact welfare. This is particularly important in
the context of EMEs such as India, which are on a scal consolidation path, and the share
of capital expenditure is already small in overall expenditures.
Our model ndings indicate that government transfers help the banking sector under
both unconditional and conditional scenarios in the short-run. Although, the equity-linked
transfer scheme provides some discipline into banks, compared to unconditional budgetary
transfer. As an o¤setting e¤ect, however, recapitalization measures crowd-out social sector
spending, which we model as utility enhancing government expenditures. This could have an
adverse impact on overall welfare. Our analysis broadly suggests that a calibrated approach
to address banks balance-sheet issues by fresh capital injection for immediate credit creation
can be given priority. However, there is a requirement for appropriate vigil on government
expenditure in the social sector to prevent long run adverse implications on welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of our paper and
benchmarks it with the existing literature. Section 3 elaborates on the model with cali-
brations and impulse responses due to negative productivity shocks under both alternative
scenarios, i.e., unconditional and conditional government transfers to banks. Finally, Section
4 concludes by o¤ering some policy insights.
2 Literature
Our paper adds to the growing literature on bank recapitalization in presence of credit-
defaults in a DSGE framework. Our focus, however, is on understanding the mechanics of
3See the 2019 Union Budget Speect, https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budgetspeech.php
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bank recapitalization in an economy with nancially constrained state-owned banks. We
model the banking sector similar to Gerali et al. (2010) and Gunn and Johri (2016). Gerali
et al. (2010) explicitly model the impact of the balance sheet on the real economy through a
DSGE framework. Firms borrow from banks to purchase new capital for future production.4
More recently, Gunn and Johri (2016) build a model with banks facing capital su¢ciency
requirements, to study the impact of news on banks portfolio. They show that a nega-
tive news shock could trigger portfolio adjustments in the presence of capital requirements,
creating a tighter credit market which pans into negative outcomes.
Banks in our model also face a friction in the form of Statutory Liquidity Requirements
(SLRs), i.e., an exogenous portion of the deposits received in every time period must be
held in the form of central government securities. This is similar to Lahiri and Patel (2016)
who argue that when the constraints bind, a reduction in the policy rate can end up raising
lending spreads causing a contraction, instead of an expansion in the economy.
The novelty of our paper lies in the fact that it attempts to study the impact of bank
recapitalization in an economy with nancially constrained state-owned banks (as in Gerali
et al. (2010) and Gunn and Johri (2016)), faced with distressed assets, increased capital
requirement, a SLR requirement (as in Lahiri and Patel (2016)), and sectoral credit obliga-
tions. In our framework, the government exists passively. They undertake utility enhancing
social spending, as in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Ambler and Paquet (1996), and
Ghate et al. (2016).
3 The model
In this model, there are ve agents - households, nal good producing rms, intermediate
capital good rms, banks and the Government. Households make deposits in banks, and
derive utility from e¤ective consumption and leisure. E¤ective consumption in this model is a
non-separable function of private consumption and utility enhancing government expenditure
4Recently, Basu et al (2018) build and calibrate a monetary DSGE model for India with banks modeled
similar to Gerali et al. (2010) to understand why the aggregate demand channel of monetary transmission
is weak.
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(see Ghate et al 2016). This is analogous to social sector spending. This guarantees that
scal policy has real labor supply outcomes. Households supply labor to rms and get a
share of the rms prots as dividends. Households also receive a portion of banks prots
in the form of dividends payments, although the Government owns majority stake in these
banks. The nal goods rms produce the nal good using labor hired from households, and
new capital purchased from the intermediate capital goods sector. The intermediate capital
goods sector on the other hand purchases undepreciated capital from the rms producing
the nal good and refurbish them to produce new capital (see Basu et al. (2018), Gunn and
Johri (2016), and Gerali et al. (2010) for a setup of the capital goods sector).
Banks receive deposits from households, of which a xed portion is mandatorily held
in the form of government bonds, i.e., SLR. This is analogous to the Basel-III mandate
of Liquidity Coverage Requirement (LCR). The remainder share of the deposits are lent to
rms to purchase new capital for producing the single nal good in the economy. Finally, the
government taxes household consumption and wage incomes, borrows by issuing bonds to
banks, and undertakes a utility-enhancing expenditure which augments households utility.
3.1 Firms
The economy consists of two sectors on the production side  a nal goods producing rm
and a capital goods producing rm. The capital goods rm supplies new capital to the nal
goods rm at a market price in every time period. The nal goods rm produces the nal
good which is consumed by the households and the government, and is the only source of
investment in the physical asset.
3.1.1 Capital goods producing rm
Our description of the capital goods producing rms is as in Gerali et al. (2010) and Basu et
al. (2018). Perfectly competitive rms buy last periods undepreciated capital, (1 K)Kt 1 
where K is the rate of depreciation of physical capital  at price Qt from the nal goods
rms and It units of the nal good. The transformation of the nal good into new capital is
subject to adjustment costs, S , such that
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S
Kt
Kt 1

=

2

Kt
Kt 1
  1
2
; (1)
where  is the adjustment cost parameter.5 The new capital is then sold to the nal goods
rm. The discounted lifetime prot function of the capital goods rm is given by
max
fKtg
E0
1X
t=0

t;t+1[Qt fKt   (1  K)Kt 1g   It]; (2)
subject to the following law of motion of capital accumulation
It = Kt   (1  K)Kt 1 +Kt 1S

Kt
Kt 1

: (3)
Note that, 
t;t+1 is a stochastic discount factor and is given by,

t;t+1 = Et

U 0 (Ct+1)
U 0 (Ct)

:
The stochastic discount factor corresponds to the expected returns the representative house-
hold gets from one period bonds and Ct is the private consumption of the representative
household in period t. Since we assume that all production activities are owned by the repre-
sentative household, the discount factor that corresponds to the capital producing rms op-
timization problem corresponds to the households expected returns from one period bonds.
The rst order condition w.r.t Kt is
fKtg : 
t;t+1 [Qt   1] = 
t;t+1

2

2

Kt
Kt 1
  1

+Et
t+1;t+2
"
(1  K) (Qt+1   1) +

2
 
1 

Kt+1
Kt
2!#
:
(4)
Equation (4) in the steady state yields,
Q = 1:
5This parametrization of adjustment costs is analogous to Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
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3.1.2 Final goods producing rm
The representative nal good producing rm, at any given time t, hires labor (Ht) and uses
capital (Kt 1) accumulated in time period t  1 to produce nal output Yt using a constant
returns to scale (CRS) technology, such that
Yt = AtK

t 1Ht
1 ; (5)
where
At  CSSP; (6)
is the exogenous Total Factor Productivity (TFP). In our calibrations, we will assume that
 < 0:5; i.e., rms are labor intensive, to capture a proto-typical aggrarian or allied sector
in an emerging economy. At period t; rm borrows Lt = QtKt from the bank in order to
purchase new capital for next period production, and repays previous period loans, Lt 1;
facing an interest rate of RLt 1: In this framework, we assume that the rm defaults in its
repayments of Lt 1 to the bank with a probability p

t . This default probability is state
contingent, i.e., on the realization of the TFP. In other words,
pt = p
 exp
 
A  At

:
Therefore, if the realized TFP is lower than the average level of TFP, the probability of
default is higher. The probability of default therefore is contingent on the state of the
economy, and is higher if the state of the economy is more bad versus less bad. Further,
we can interpret a negative shock to productivity as a negative rainfall shock. We also assume
that these rms receive loans from banks in every time period, irrespective of the nature of
the rm. In other words, unlike Mitra (2013), we do not specify a borrowing constraint on
the rms in order to disincentivize rms of low-type from borrowing. This is because,
we are eventually calibrating our model to India, where a large share of its population is
engaged in agrarian or allied sectors, and are rainfall dependent. These are also identied
as priority sectors by the government and banks. Therefore, irrespective of their type, these
rms receive credit from banks. A negative monsoon shock can therefore have a systemic
e¤ect on the banking sector and on the overall economy.
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The representative rm maximizes its discouted life-time prots given by,
max
fKt;Htg
E0
1X
t=0

t;t+1[Yt  WtHt  QtKt+ (7)
(1  K)QtKt 1 + Lt   (1  p

t )R
L
t 1Lt 1];
This yields the following rst order conditions w.r.t. Kt and Ht
fKtg : Et


Yt+1
Kt
+ (1  k)Qt+1  
 
1  pt+1

RLt Qt

= 0 (8)
fHtg : Et

(1  )
Yt
Ht
 Wt

= 0 (9)
In the steady state,
K =

A
Q[(1  p)RL   (1  k)]
 1
1 
H
H =

(1  )A
w
 1

K
3.2 Households
The economy is populated by innitely lived households with a mass normalized to 1. A
stand-in representative household consumes and invests a homogenous good. It also supplies
labor and capital to rms. The household derives utility from e¤ective consumption (Ct ) and
leisure (1 Ht). The representative household has the following expected discounted lifetime
utility
E0
1X
t=0
tU(Ct ; Ht); (10)
where  2 (0; 1) denotes the households subjective discount factor. We assume that
Ct = Ct + G
C
t ;  > 0 (11)
where household consumption (Ct) is augmented by government consumption (G
C
t ). The
parameter  captures the weight of public consumption in household utility, where  > 0.
Given our specication in equation (11), Ct and G
C
t are assumed to be perfect substitutes.
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6In an emerging markets context, an example of GCt can be public health or public transportation services.
See Barro (1981), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Ambler and Paquet (1996), and Ghate et al. (2016).
Households in a typical emerging economy, rely heavily on such public services.
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The only source of consumption smoothing for the household is that they make bank deposits.
Households make deposits dt in state owned banks on which they receive gross interest income
RDt . They supply labor to rms, and in return receive wages Wt:They also receive (1   e)
proportion of the banks prot, bt . Therefore, the representative household maximizes the
following discounted life-time utility function
max
fCt;Ht;dtg
E0
1X
t=0
t[ln(Ct + G
C
t ) + ln(1 Ht)], (12)
subject to,
(1 + C)Ct + dt  (1  W )WtHt +R
D
t 1dt 1 + (1  e)
b
t ;
where C is the tax on consumption, and W is the tax on labor income. First order conditions
yield
1
Ct
= Et

RDt
Ct+1

; (13)
Ct
Wt

1 + C
1  W

= 1 Ht (14)
where (13) is the Euler equation, and (14) is the standard marginal rate of substitution
between e¤ective consumption and leisure.
In the steady state,
RD =
1

;
that is, in the steady state, the deposit rate is the inverse of the discount factor. Finally,

C
W

1 + C
1  W

= 1 H:
3.3 Banks
Banks are state-owned. A portion e of a representative banks prots in every time period t;
goes to the government, and the rest goes to households. The bank receives deposits dt from
the household, a fraction  of which is held as government bonds. On these government
bonds, the bank earns a pre-announced gross interest rate of RGt at a given t: The remaining
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proportion (1 ) of total deposits is used for lending activity to the nal goods producing
rms so that they can purchase new capital from the intermediate capital producing sector.
The lending rate is RLt at a given time period t: The bank also incurs a monitoring cost (Lt)
to reduce the default risk. In case of a default, banks receive a transfer ptR
L
t 1Lt 1 from
the government for the loss incurred due to non-repayment by rms. While, theoretically it
is interesting to model banks receiving recapitalization based on their e¤orts in identifying
bad loans, and banks receiving recapitalization in India is also linked to their performances,
we abstain from these moral hazard issues in our current framework. This is because,
in some of the EMEs, including India, banks extend substantial portion of their credit to
the agricultural sector. Though the share of agriculture in the overall GDP is declining in
India, it continues to employ considerable share of the overall labor force and therefore plays
an important role in aggregate demand, and consequently in aggregate welfare. Given the
agricultural dependence of aggregate demand, and state-ownership of banks, we assume in a
simplied framework, that the general government waivers o¤ a portion of the banks bad-
loans or infuses capital against equity in banks, when faced with a negative productivity
shock, e.g, a bad monsoon shock.
The following is the optimization problem of a representative state owned bank.
bt = E0
1X
t=0

t;t+1[dt  R
D
t 1dt 1   Lt + (1  p

t )R
L
t 1Lt 1 (15)
  dt +R
G
t 1dt 1   (Lt) + p

tR
L
t 1Lt 1]
where,
Lt  (1  )dt (16)
(Lt) = L

t ;   1: (17)
This yields the rst order condition
RDt = (1  )R
L
t + R
G
t  
1

(1  )d 1t (18)
Assuming  = 1 for analytical tractability, in the steady state,
RL =
1  RG + (1  )
(1  )
: (19)
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Equation (19) is the No-Arbitrage condition which governs the relationship between the
steady deposit rate, the gross returns on government bonds, and the lending rate. We can
show that as  increases, RL; i.e., the steady state gross lending rate decreases. At the
same time, as RG increases, RL decreases. This could happen because sovereign bonds
in domestic currency, are generally considered risk free, and therefore are assigned zero
risk weight. A bank, faced with a binding capital-to-risk-weighted asset ratio (CRAR), is
therefore likely to invest more in zero risk-weighted assets rather than investing in risky
ventures. This regulatory arbitrage could result in dampened capital formation, impacting
long-term economic growth and welfare. To avoid such a regulatory arbitrage, governments
have been facing increasing demand for budgetary allocation to banks capital, for promoting
e¢cient capital formation and consequently economic growth.
3.4 Government
The government exists passively in this model. It exogenously imposes taxes on consumption
(C) and wage income (W ) and receives a proportion e of banks prots.
7 An indirect tax,
C is included in view of Indias large dependence on indirect taxes, introduction of GST,
and to give additional exibility for the purpose of calibrating our model. The government
also extends transfers to banks to compensate them for losses incurred due to non-repayment
by rms, i.e., bad loans. The following is the budget constraint faced by the government,
GCt = CCt + WWtHt   R
G
t dt 1 + dt + e
b
t   pR
L
t Lt 1 (20)
One of the simplifying assumptions of our model is that the government does not optimize
scal policy. It imposes an exogenous taxes, and SLR on banks which is mainly because of
the macro-prudential considerations, that helps nance government borrowing. The govern-
ment waives o¤ a portion of banks bad loans unconditionally or transfers capital against
equity mainly to smooth the impact of a negative productivity shock and such transfers
crowd out governments utility enhancing expenditure (GCt ). In our model, the government
7In an extension, we will analyze the model under endogenous wage income tax adjustments for exogenous
government spending.
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budget constraint (GBC) is therefore balanced using GCt therefore taking care of Ricardian
Equivalence.
3.5 The non-stochastic steady state system
The following summarizes the non-stochastic steady state of the system8
C
W

1 + C
1  W

= 1 H (21)
RD =
1

(22)
(1 + C)C + d = (1  W )WH +R
Dd+ (1  e)b (23)
Q = 1 (24)
K =

A
Q[(1  p)RL   (1  k)]
 1
1 
GPH (25)
H =
"
(1  )A
 
GP
1 
w
# 1

K (26)
L = QK (27)
Y = AK(GPH)1  (28)
RL =
1  RG + (1  )
(1  )
(29)
b = (1  )(
1

  1)d (30)
L = (1  )d (31)
GC = CC + WWH   R
Gd+ d+ eb   pRLL (32)
3.6 Numerical simulations
3.6.1 Parameter Values
We x the tax rate on consumption c = 0:12 and  = 0:35 from Ghate et al. (2016). We
normalize average Total Factor Productivity, A = 1. Given that India has a very narrow
income tax base and depends more on generating revenue from indirect taxation, we allow
8See Appendix for derivations.
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for a low income tax at w = 0:01 (see Poirson (2006)). The depreciation rate of capital
k = 0:1, which matches approximately 10% of annual rate of depreciation (Gabriel et al.
(2012)). The gross rate of return on government bonds RG is equal to 1:02 which roughly
matches the long run average gross real rate of return on 91-day treasury bill rates in India.
The mandatory proportion of deposits that are to be held in the form of government bonds
, is equals to 0:2; which roughly matches the Statutory Liquidity Rates in India. The
households discount rate  is xed at 0:98 (see Gabriel et al. (2012)). Monitoring cost
parameters  and  are arbitrarily xed at values > 1 and > 1 respectively: The capital
adjustment cost  is arbitrarily chosen to be equal to 0:2. Table 1 summarizes our choice of
deep parameters in our model.
Parameters Values Source
 0:35 Ghate et al. (2016)
 0:98 Gabriel et al. (2012)
 > 1 Arbitrary
 > 1 Arbitrary
 0:2 Arbitrary
c 0:12 Ghate et al. (2016)
w 0:01 Poisron (2001)
 0:5 Arbitrary
k 0:1 Data
RG 1:02 Data
 0:2 Data
p; A Exogenous Authors
Table 1: Parameters for Calibration
3.7 Impulse Response Functions
In this section, we will analyze the impact of a one period (negative monsoon) shock to
productivity that a¤ects the probability of default, pt : In particular, we assume that poor
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monsoon operates as a negative productivity shock, and follows a CSSP process, i.e.9,
pt = p
 exp
 
A  At

; where At  CSSP::
TFP At in turn is modeled as follows
At = A exp
 bAt ;
where
bAt = A bAt 1 + "At; and
"At  N
 
0; 2A

:
A negative productivity shock will correspond to a negative draw of "At from N (0; 
2
A) :
3.7.1 Baseline case - Unconditional transfers
Suppose the government makes an unconditional transfer, i.e., a loan waiver. In this case,
the government compensates banks for all the loss due to non-repayment by the borrowing
rms. In other words, the transfers made by the government to the representative bank is
ptR
L
t Lt 1:
This is equivalent to an ex-post transfer extended to banks, which e¤ectively lowers the
borrowing costs of rms due to the absence of provision requirements. Such a recapitalization
measure helps insulate banks that are a¤ected by loan defaults on account of negative and
exogenous shocks.
The default probabilities p are contingent on the state of the economy. They are tied to
realizations of TFP, such that,
pt = p
 exp
 
A  At

:
This implies, if At < A; p

t > p
; i.e., the probability of default increases, in comparison to
the steady state.
9Our motivation for this specication is to capture the borrowers inability to repay loans on account of
crop failures, which culminates into large decline in aggregate demand.
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Now, suppose there is a one period productivity shock. Figure 1 shows the impulse re-
sponse functions of various macroeconomic variables. A negative productivity shock leads
to an increase in the probability of default, and impacts the nal good rms compelling
them to default. However, the government bails out banks through their transfer schemes.
This, from the GBC, impacts utility enhancing government expenditure, and therefore ad-
versely impacts household welfare. In an attempt to maintain e¤ective consumption, C*,
the household supplies more labor. The rm, in face of an increase in labor supply, bor-
rows from banks in order to purchase capital. Therefore, an increased labor supply coupled
with bank recapitalization, resulting increased demand for loans helps in maintaining / mar-
ginally increasing output even in a situation of an adverse productivity shock. However,
private consumption drops because current wages fall, and interest rates increase, thereby
dis-incentivizing current private consumption. On the whole, this results in a welfare loss
for households.
The government transfers help in uninterrupted credit disbursement by banks that sup-
port capital formation and help in maintaining output. However, overall welfare is adversely
impacted because of fall in government utility enhancing expenditure, increased labour sup-
ply and increased deposit demand, and decline in dividend from bank prots, thereby further
reducing current private consumption.
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Figure 1: One period negative productivity shock
3.8 Conditional transfers
Now suppose, the government imposes a rule that it will transfer ptR
L
t Lt 1 to banks in the
instance of rms defaulting, but in return, insists on a higher equity holding of banks, a case
18
similar to capital infusion in banks. In this case, we assume
e = e+$:p; $ > 0;
i.e., a higher p implies higher e, or in other words, a higher share of the representative banks
prots accrues to the government. As a consequence, the residual bank prots accruing to
households is lower.
Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions of a one period productivity shock in the
case where the government demands higher equity holding in banks prots in return of
higher transfers being made, on account of higher p. As before, the default probability of
the rm is tied to the productivity business cycle such that,
pt = p
 exp(A  At)
It is observed that the impact of a negative productivity shock on the real economy re-
mains qualitatively unchanged. However, the welfare loss is lesser now as compared to the
unconditional transfer case. This is mainly so because now the government holds a higher
stake in banks and absorbs the decline in b. Therefore the decline in private consumption
through the income channel is weakened compared to the unconditional case. Consequently,
in this scenario with equity transfers, the increase labour supply and decline in wages are
also weakened culminating to a net positive e¤ect on the income tax collection (as compared
with unconditional transfer). On the net GCt declines by less, compared to the case of uncon-
ditional transfers. As a result, the overall decline in household welfare is smaller compared
to the case of unconditional transfers.
19
Figure 2: One period productivity shock: endogenous equity
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4 Conclusion and policy implications
The goal of this paper is to understand the impact of governments attempt to strengthen
/ recapitalize banks. To this end, we analyze a DSGE model with ve agents - households,
nal good rms, capital good rms, banks and the Government. In our model with state-
owned banks, the government makes an unconditional transfer to the banks for the loss
due to non-repayment by the borrowing rms. Impulse responses for a negative shock to
productivity show that there are large welfare costs due to lower public utility spending,
lower private consumption and wages. However, the knowledge of government transfers in
cases of default reduced the cost of capital and enhances capital formation. This helps to
smooth output and employment even in the face of a negative productivity shock.
We then consider an alternative scenario of conditional transfers, where the government
allocates capital in exchange of banks equity. Assuming equity to be one-to-one linked with
the transfers, the impulse response functions of a negative productivity shock shows similar
qualitative impacts on the real economy but, with a relatively smaller fall in public utility
spending as compared to the unconditional case. This suggests equity transfers could be a
better way of implementing a recapitalization program.
Our analysis suggests that bank recapitalization is a welcome move to kick-start credit
creation, capital formation and growth. However, there is a need for appropriate policy vigil
to protect the quality of public expenditure in the social sector that matters for welfare.
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Technical Appendix
Derivation of the closed form solutions for the baseline model
From { 28} and { 25} respectively, we have
Y =

A

K
Y
 1
1 
H
K
Y
=

(1  p)RL   (1  K)
Substituting for K
Y
; we get
Y =

A


(1  p)RL   (1  K)
 1
1 
H
=) Y = 6H (33)
Now, Manipulating { 21}, we get:
H =
1
1 +
(1+C)(
C
Y
+G
C
Y
)
(1 W )(1 )
(34)
Next, Dividing both sides of the consumers budget constraint { 23}by Y and rearranging,
we get
(1 + C)
C
Y
= (1  W )(1  ) +

1

  1

+

1

  1

(1  e)(1  )

d
Y
=)
C
Y
=
(1  W )(1  ) +
h
1

  1

+

1

  1

(1  e)(1  )
i
d
Y
(1 + C)
= 5 (35)
Similarly, dividing both sides of the governments budget constraint { 32) by Y , we get
GC
Y
= C
C
Y
+ W (1  ) +

e(1  )

1

  1

  (RG   1)  pRL(1  )

d
Y
=)
GC
Y
= C5 + W (1  ) + 3 (36)
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where,
d
Y
=
1
1  


(1  p)RL   (1  K)

= 2
3 =

e(1  )

1

  1

  (RG   1)  pRL(1  )

2
Substituting { 35} and { 36} into { 34)
H =
1
1 + (1+C)
(1 W )(1 )
f5 +  [C5 + W (1  ) + 3]g
(37)
Solving { 33} and { 37} simultaneously
H =
(1  W )(1  )6
6f(1  W )(1  ) + (1 + C)[5 + C5 + W (1  ) + 3]g
= 7 (38)
Y = 67 (39)
C = 567 (40)
K =


(1  p)RL   (1  K)

67 (41)
W = (1  )6 (42)
d =
1
(1  )


(1  p)RL   (1  K)

67 (43)
b = 

1

  1


(1  p)RL   (1  K)

67 (44)
GC = CC + W (1  )67 + 367 (45)
Derivation of the closed form solutions for the model with endoge-
nous taxation
Dividing both sides of the governments budget constraint { 32} by Y and rearranging, we
get
W (1  ) =
GC
Y
  C
C
Y
  3 (46)
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Similarly, dividing both sides of the consumers budget constraint { 23} by Y and rear-
ranging, we get
(1 + C)
C
Y
= (1  W )(1  ) +

1

  1

+

1

  1

(1  e)(1  )

d
Y
(47)
By solving { 46} and { 47} simultaneously, we get
C
Y
= (1  ) 
GC
Y
+ 3 +

1

  1

+

1

  1

(1  e)(1  )

d
Y
=)
C
Y
= (1  ) 
GC
Y
+ 3 + Z (48)
and
W (1  ) = (1 + C)

GC
Y
  3

  C(1  )  CZ (49)
Where,
Z =

1

  1

+

1

  1

(1  e)(1  )

2
Substituting { 48} and { 49} in { 34} and solving for H, we get
H = a (50)
Y = 6a (51)
C = (1  )6a G
C + 36a+ Z6a (52)
W = (1  )6 (53)
K =


(1  p)RL   (1  K)

6a (54)
d =
1
(1  )


(1  p)RL   (1  K)

6a (55)
W =
(1 + C)
(1  )

GC
6a
  3

  C  
C
(1  )
Z (56)
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